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THE HOLLOW PROMISE OF AN ACCOUNTING 
STANDARD SETTER 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose – This paper applies a power framework to critically analyse the 
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Publicly available data, including comment letters, 
annual reports, company websites, and IASC/IASB pronouncements, is used to make 
connections between the key plays involved in the international accounting standard 
setting process for the extractive industries.  
 
Findings – Lukes’ (1974) conception of power is used to explain the community of 
interests that developed between the IASC/IASB and extractive industries 
constituents.  This community of interests is shown to have enabled the extractive 
industries to mobilise its power to paralyse the standard setting body and secure 
favourable regulation.  While the politicisation of accounting standard setting is 
widely acknowledged, the revelation that economically dominant groups can covertly 
wield such power is a sobering one in the light of the worldwide promotion and 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards.   
 
Originality/value – This paper contributes to understanding of the presence of power 
in the international accounting standard setting process and how it is mobilised by key 
constituents.   
 
Key words – International accounting standards, extractive industries, power, 
standard setting, financial accounting 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), a profound 
change has occurred in the way many entities, including the world’s largest public 
companies, produce their general purpose financial reports.  This is particularly 
significant in the case of extractive industries accounting, with the International 
Accounting Standards Board yet to develop a comprehensive international accounting 
standard, and instead still struggling to achieve consensus among the many and varied 
interests of constituents.  With accounting and accounting standard setting now 
accepted as being highly politicised activities, this paper provides insight into the 
constituents that contribute to the process of developing an international accounting 
standard for the extractive industries.   
Defined as the petroleum (oil and gas) and mining industries (International 
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a), the extractive industries have substantial 
economic, social, political, and environmental impacts.  Many of the world’s largest 
extractive companies, such as the Royal Dutch/Shell group, BP, BHP Billiton, and 
ExxonMobil, are well known and established household names.  The economic 
strength of the major extractive industries companies is such that many are richer and 
more powerful than the states and even countries that seek to regulate them (Global 
Policy Forum, 2006).  Indeed, six of the world’s top twelve companies are from the 
extractive industries, being BP, Chevron/Texaco, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, the 
Royal Dutch/Shell group, and TOTAL (Anderson and Cavanagh, 2000, Fortune 
Magazine, 2005).  In 2005, these six companies recorded combined revenues in 
excess of US$1.2 trillion and profits of US$92 billion (Fortune Magazine, 2005).  
Comparing the combined revenues of these six global companies with current United 
States Gross Domestic Product of US$11 trillion (World Bank, 2005) gives some 
perspective of the enormous economic strength of the major international extractive 
industries companies.  The political influence of this sector flows on from its 
economic strength.  Extractive industry coalitions have been active lobbyists in 
regulatory debates concerning issues such as global climate change, taxation policy, 
and sustainable development, with many, such as the American Petroleum Institute, 
formed specifically for the purpose of influencing public policy and regulatory 
processes for the benefit of members (American Petroleum Institute, 2006).   
The environmental impacts are arguably the most visible consequence of 
extractive activities.  The negative environmental impacts of mining are well-
publicised, with, for example, the BHP mine in Ok Tedi, Papua New Guinea (BHP 
Ltd, 1999), and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2006), attracting substantial publicity as a result of the devastating 
environmental and socio-economic impacts.  In response, extractive industries 
enterprises have sought to improve their corporate images, with many implementing 
extensive environmental programs to monitor and ensure the environmental 
sustainability of their operations.   
The social impacts of the extractive industries are also significant.  Major 
extractive operations can be responsible for improving infrastructure in and around 
the area being mined, increasing capital investment to a community and/or country, 
providing employment opportunities, and boosting local economies.  Indeed, many 
developing countries benefit substantially from the royalty payments from mining 
companies.  For example, mining in Papua New Guinea accounts for approximately 
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21 percent of its Gross Domestic Product and 75 percent of export earnings 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2004).   
The substantial economic, political, social, and environmental impacts of the 
extractive industries contribute to the accountability of this sector and make evident 
the importance of the accounting practices used by extractive industries companies to 
report on their financial performance and position.  One aspect of extractive industries 
accounting that has been plagued by controversy concerning the methods of 
accounting for pre-production activities.  In an attempt to report on this phase of 
extractive operations in the most favourable light, the full cost and successful efforts 
methods of accounting have developed.1  These two methods of accounting have been 
the cause of considerable controversy within the extractive industries due to the 
significantly different results generated under each method.  First raised in the United 
States of America (US) in the 1960s (Van Riper, 1994), the debate over successful 
efforts versus full cost accounting has remained unresolved.  Companies in the US, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom are still able to choose between these two methods 
of accounting when reporting on exploration and evaluation activities.   
In 1998, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) undertook 
to remedy the disparate accounting practices by proposing the development of an 
international accounting standard that enhanced comparability and consistency of 
financial reporting by extractive industries companies across the world (International 
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).  This was to be achieved, in part, by 
narrowing accounting alternatives and prescribing a single method of accounting for 
exploration and evaluation consistent with the successful efforts concept 
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).     
The full cost versus successful efforts issue was considered in the IASC’s 
Extractive Industries Issues Paper (hereafter referred to as the Issues Paper), published 
in November 2000 (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).  The 
Issues Paper was the first stage in the process of developing an international 
accounting standard for the extractive industries and, as part of the process, was 
opened for public comment until June 2001.  Comment letters were received from 52 
respondents, with many of these from multinational extractive industries companies 
and extractive industries lobby groups.  While the majority of respondents supported 
the proposal to narrow accounting alternatives and require all companies to report 
under the successful efforts method, two industry lobby groups vehemently opposed 
the proposal and argued that both the successful efforts and full cost methods should 
continue to be permitted.     
After a series of delays, incorporating the IASC’s restructure and reformation 
as the IASB, an international accounting standard for the extractive industries was 
finally issued in December 2004 (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004c).  
However, despite the claimed intentions of narrowing accounting alternatives and 
bringing about consistency in extractive industries reporting, in the resultant 
accounting standard, the IASB failed to achieve these objectives.  Instead, 
International Financial Reporting Standard 6, Exploration for and Evaluation of 
Minerals Resources (IFRS 6), granted extractive industries companies an exemption 
from the restrictive provisions contained in other international accounting standards.  
This had the effect of enabling extractive industries companies to continue to use the 
accounting policies in place immediately before the adoption of IFRS 6 to account for 
                                                 
1  The area-of-interest method and appropriation methods are other derivatives of these two main 
methods, and are practiced in Australia and South Africa respectively. 
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exploration and evaluation expenditure.  In sum, IFRS 6 merely codified existing 
industry practice, perpetuating the disparate methods of accounting for exploration 
and evaluation, and maintaining the status quo for extractive industries companies.   
The striking failure of the IASB to follow through with its aim of remedying 
the inconsistencies of extractive industries accounting, particularly with respect to the 
successful efforts versus full cost issue led to a consideration of the possible factors 
that may have influenced this decision.  Of interest, therefore, is the story behind the 
process of setting the international accounting standard for the extractive industries.  
This story cannot be conveyed by a perfunctory analysis of the positions for and 
against the IASC/IASB’s proposals and how these might be linked to the outcome of 
the process.  Rather, it is necessary to consider who took these positions, in addition to 
identifying others perhaps less visibly involved, in order to gain insight into how the 
accounting standard was developed.  
To tell this story, the international accounting standard setting process for the 
extractive industries was examined with a view to illuminating the political nature of 
accounting, and exposing the underlying institutions and arrangements of accounting.  
The presence of power and its effect on the outcome of the international accounting 
standard setting process was then explained by using Lukes’ (1974) theory of power.  
This theory was used to argue that the role of power in the international accounting 
standard setting process is such that the extractive industries have mobilised their 
power, captured the IASC/IASB and paralysed the standard setting process in order to 
maintain the status quo of flexibility in accounting and financial reporting.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the research approach is 
described in the next section and applied to the international accounting standard 
setting process for the extractive industries.  This is followed by a discussion of power 
theory and how it can be used to explain the presence of power in the standard setting 
process.  Connections between key constituents are then revealed.  Finally, 
conclusions regarding the presence of power in the international accounting standard 
setting process for the extractive industries are presented, along with research 
limitations and opportunities for future research. 
RESEARCH APPROACH: CRITICALLY EXAMINING 
THE PROCESS 
As noted, the purpose of this research was to examine the processes that led to the 
issue of IFRS 6 and, thereby, the codification of existing disparate extractive 
industries accounting practices.  International accounting standards are set within an 
institutional context that incorporates the IASC/IASB funding arrangements and the 
IASC/IASB due process procedures.  Within this institutional structure, IASC/IASB 
constituents may participate in the standard setting processes.  Examining these 
constituents and their role is crucial to a critical investigation of international 
accounting standard setting process because it enables the researcher to go behind the 
scenes of the process to make visible the powerful coalitions and players that 
contribute to and influence the process.  Importantly, without this deep, multi-layered 
analysis, these coalitions and players may otherwise remain masked by the 
promulgated transparency and objectivity of the international accounting standard 
setting arrangements (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004b).   
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THE IASC/IASB FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS 
The IASC launched its external funding program in 1990, with revenue received from 
three main sources: fees paid by Board members and by the International Federation 
of Accountants, profits made on IASC publications, and voluntary contributions made 
by companies and other organisations with an interest in the work of the IASC 
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 1999).  Under these arrangements, 
the major international accounting firms were the IASC’s largest source of funding 
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 1993).   
This funding model was considered to be a considerable threat to the 
legitimacy of the international accounting standards because the IASC relied on 
voluntary endorsement of, and compliance with, its standards from the same 
constituents that were funding its activities.  In an attempt to overcome this problem, 
the Committee was restructured in 2000 and the International Accounting Standards 
Committee Foundation (IASCF) was formed as a not-for-profit entity.  A board of 
trustees was appointed to the Foundation and charged with the responsibility of 
raising funds to support the international accounting standard setting activities 
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2004a).  The IASC was renamed the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the trustees also became 
responsible for appointing members to the Board and overseeing the IASB’s activities 
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2004a). 
  Under the new funding arrangements, large multinational corporations, stock 
exchanges, national accounting standard setting bodies, central banks, government 
entities, international agencies, and international accounting firms became the 
benefactors of the IASB (Brown, 2004, International Accounting Standards 
Committee Foundation, 2004).  The major international accounting firms continued to 
be the primary supporters, with each pledging to contribute £1 million per annum to 
the IASB, approximately one-third of the IASB’s estimated operating budget.  In 
2004, the IASB received contributions totalling over £9 million from 184 
corporations, associations, and other institutions, including a number of the world’s 
leading multinational corporations such as BP plc, Shell International, General 
Electric, Pfizer, Vodaphone, and the New York Stock Exchange (International 
Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 2004).  
Despite these efforts to improve the actual and perceived transparency of the 
external funding program, the arrangements continued to come under attack from 
commentators who suggest that there still exists a dependency relationship between 
the IASC/IASB and its benefactors, which may influence the issues considered 
(Brown, 2004, Mitchell, et al., 1994, Mitchell and Sikka, 1993).  For example, it has 
been argued that critical issues, such as environmental and social accounting and 
accounting for small and medium sized enterprises, are marginalised in favour of 
those that align with the political and economic interests of supporters (Brown, 2004).  
Brown (2004) further noted that the IASB’s current agenda items, which cover 
business combinations, present value, financial instruments, and extractive industries, 
are indeed consistent with concerns facing the large, multinational conglomerates that 
support the IASB.  Mitchell and Sikka (1993, p.29) have similarly argued that the 
“institutions and practices of accountancy are collusive and undemocratic” and that 
institutions, such as the IASC/IASB, are “dedicated to defending the status quo and 
sectional interests rather than wider interests”.  A related transparency issue in the 
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international accounting standard setting arrangements involves the due process 
procedures followed by the IASC/IASB when developing a standard.   
THE IASC/IASB DUE PROCESS 
The IASC/IASB’s due process procedures were designed to protect the openness, 
neutrality, and independence of the accounting standard setting process and enable 
arguments for and against proposals to be raised at several points during the 
development of a standard (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004a).  The 
due process for the extractive industries accounting standard began in 1998 when the 
IASC added the project to its formal agenda.  Before considering the due process in 
more detail, it is important to note the significance of the agenda setting process itself.  
The IASB states that  
(b)oard members, members of the Standards Advisory Council, national 
standard setters, securities regulators, other organizations and individuals and 
the IASB staff are encouraged to submit suggestions for new topics that 
might be dealt with in the IASB’s standards (International Accounting 
Standards Board, 2004b). 
Thus the agenda setting process can be considered an exercise of power in 
which certain issues may be “disregarded or suppressed and denied agenda entrance” 
(Walker and Robinson, 1993, p.4).  In this way, the agenda may be restricted to 
relatively safe issues as a result of confining the scope of decision making (Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1970, p.43).  Further, Cousins and Sikka (1993, p.53) noted that even 
once an issue is placed on the formal agenda, it may be that subsequent information, 
such as that gathered during the due process, is “controlled by the very people/groups 
who are being called to account”.  In other words, the “facts” surrounding an issue 
may be shaped by the priorities and influence of powerful groups who wish to 
maintain the status quo (Cousins and Sikka, 1993, p.4).   
There is no publicly available information regarding how, by whom, or why the 
extractive industries project was initiated, however the international prominence, 
economic influence, and divergent accounting practices of the extractive industries 
were listed as factors contributing to the importance of the project (International 
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).  Further, as will be revealed in subsequent 
sections, many of the IASC/IASB’s financial underwriters and supporters are 
extractive industries enterprises.  Thus, following the reasoning of Brown (2004) and 
Mitchell and Sikka (1993), it may be argued that the admission of the project to the 
IASC’s agenda, at least in part, was a consequence of the relationship between the 
IASC and its extractive industries benefactors. 
The IASC’s extractive industries project aimed to address accounting 
measurement and disclosure issues for the extractive industries, and was led by a 
Steering Committee developed specifically for the project (International Accounting 
Standards Committee, 2000b).  The Steering Committee was internationally 
representative, with members from Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, South 
Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America 
(US) (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a, Micallef, 2001).  The 
professional backgrounds of Committee members’ were also varied and included past 
 8
and/or present partners of each of the Big 4 accounting firms, past and/or present 
mining and petroleum company executives, academics, and financial analysts. 
The Steering Committee reached its first milestone in November 2000, with the 
publication of the Extractive Industries Issues Paper.   The Issues Paper was a 412 
page document consisting of 16 chapters, which raised a number of “Basic Issues” 
concerning matters such as reserve estimation and valuation, recognition and 
measurement of inventories, and financial statement disclosures. The Issues Paper 
was published with an invitation for interested parties to comment by 30 June 2001 on 
the matters raised.  In addition, given the “widespread interest” in the project, the 
Steering Committee also sent the Issues Paper to the “senior financial officers of 
nearly 300 extractive industries companies worldwide” with a direct request for 
comment (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000b, p.19).  To guide 
commentators, the Issues Paper set out the Steering Committee’s tentative views on 
some of the issues considered most significant.  For example, in chapter four of the 
Issues Paper, one of the Basic Issues concerned the accounting method to be used by 
petroleum enterprises for their financial statements, with the Steering Committee 
indicating its preference for a method consistent with the successful efforts concept.  
An excerpt from chapter four, shown in Exhibit 1, illustrates this example.   
Basic Issue 4.1 - Historical cost concepts for petroleum enterprises 
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a, p.88)
Exhibit 1: Excerpt from chapter four of the Issues Paper
d. Accounting standards more consistent with the appropriation concept than with the other 
concepts.
Steering Committee Tentative View:                                                                                           
For petroleum enterprises, the Steering Committee favours adoption of a method more 
consistent with the successful efforts concept than with the other concepts.
For petroleum enterprises, if one of the historical cost concepts were required for the 
primary financial statements, which of the following concepts, broadly defined, should 
be adopted? Each of these concepts is interpreted in a variety of ways in practice 
today. 
a. Accounting standards more consistent with the successful efforts concept than with the 
other concepts. 
b. Accounting standards more consistent with the area-of-interest concept than with the other 
concepts.
c. Accounting standards more consistent with the full cost concept than with the other 
concepts.
 
Respondents to the Issues Paper were required to indicate their preferences on 
the Basic Issues raised and thereby indicate their agreement or disagreement with the 
Steering Committee’s tentative views.   
THE COMMENTS LETTERS 
Despite the Steering Committee’s efforts to elicit responses, and the supposed interest 
in the project, 52 comment letters were received in respect of the Issues Paper.  These 
were from respondents in countries including Australia, Canada, China, Germany, 
South Africa, the UK, and the US.  The principal activities of the respondents were 
varied and included mining and petroleum companies, extractive industries lobby 
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groups, international accounting firms, professional accounting bodies, standard 
setting bodies, and academics.  To summarise this information, respondents have been 
categorised according to location and into one of the following groups: mining 
companies, mining industry lobby groups, petroleum companies, petroleum industry 
lobby groups, accounting firms, professional accounting and standard setting 
organisations, and others (academics and individuals).  Table 1 presents this summary 
of the respondents according to location and principal activity.  
Mining 
companies and 
their 
representative 
groups
Petroleum 
companies and 
their 
representative 
groups
Professional 
accounting and 
standard setting 
organisations
Chartered 
accounting 
firms Others Total
Argentina 1 1
Australia 8 1 1 2 12
Belgium 1 1
Canada 1 1 2
China 1 1
Germany 3 1 4
International 2 2
Italy 1 1
Japan 1 1
Kazakhstan 1 1
Pakistan 1 1
South Africa 5 1 1 7
Sweden 1 1
UK 2 5 3 10
USA 6 6
Zimbabwe 1 1
Total 15 17 13 4 3 52
Lo
ca
tio
n
Principal activity
Table 1: Responses to the Issues Paper, categorised according to location and principal 
activity of respondents
 
 
As shown in Table 1, the majority of comment letters were received from 
Australian commentators (21 percent), followed by the UK (19 percent), South Africa 
(13 percent), the US (13 percent), Germany (8 percent), and Canada (4 percent).  
Petroleum companies and petroleum industry lobby groups were the largest 
respondent group (33 percent), followed by mining companies and mining industry 
lobby groups (29 percent), professional accounting and standard setting organisations 
(25 percent), the Big 4 accounting firms (7 percent), and others (6 percent).   
As noted, one of the controversies addressed in the Issues Paper concerned the 
method of accounting for pre-production activities.  Respondents were asked to 
comment on which of the four methods of accounting for pre-production costs should 
be adopted by an international accounting standard for the extractive industries (full 
cost, successful efforts, area-of-interest, appropriation) (International Accounting 
Standards Committee, 2000a).  In addition, respondents were to indicate whether they 
advocated the use of only one of these methods or whether more than one method 
should be permitted.  The Steering Committee’s tentative view was that a method 
consistent with the successful efforts concept should be adopted and that only this 
method of accounting for pre-production costs should be permitted (see Exhibit 1 for 
example).   
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There was overwhelming support for the use of the successful efforts method 
of accounting with 87 percent of respondents commenting on this issue indicating a 
preference for the successful efforts method only.  Support for the use of the 
successful efforts method was hardly surprising, given the desire of the extractive 
industries companies to maintain the status quo.  In contrast, only 13 percent of 
respondents commenting on this issue indicated their support for having the option of 
both the successful efforts and full cost methods.  Thus, the Steering Committee’s 
tentative view on this issue was supported, with the majority of respondents preferring 
a single method of accounting for pre-production costs consistent with the successful 
efforts concept. 
This content-based type of analysis is characteristic of most studies of 
accounting standard setting.  It is also considered to be preliminary in this research 
because it is limited in three respects: First, who is making a particular argument and 
what is being said is masked by the aggregation of the responses.  Treating 
submissions as votes does not take into account the relative power of the respondents 
making the submissions, nor does it reflect the decision making processes of the 
IASC/IASB, which is arguably more complex than a simple tally of preferences 
(Walker and Robinson, 1993).  Secondly, the relationships between the respondents 
and other key (but perhaps less visible) players in the process remains hidden.  Simply 
because a company does not respond directly, and therefore publicly, to the 
IASC/IASB on a proposed issue does not mean that they have played no part in the 
accounting standard setting process (Walker and Robinson, 1993).  Thirdly, based on 
the preliminary analysis, there appears to be little conflict among respondents and the 
IASC.  This apparent absence of conflict over the successful efforts and full cost 
methods is contrary to the long-standing and intense debate that has surrounded this 
issue.  As such, it is pertinent closely to examine the responses, and the respondents 
and other key players in the extractive industries and the relationship between them.  
This is consistent with the second and third dimensions of power theory because it 
seeks to reveal how shared meanings may be created between the players and how 
this ultimately influences the development of the accounting standard.  In the 
following section, power theory is discussed before further examining the key players 
in the standard setting process for the extractive industries and the overlaps between 
them. 
POWER THEORY 
To explain the presence of power in the international accounting standard setting 
process and its effect of the outcome of the IASC/IASB’s extractive industries 
project, a Lukes’ (1974) three dimensional view of power was relied upon.   
LUKES’ (1974) FIRST DIMENSION OF POWER  
Lukes’  (1974) first dimension of power is based on the “pluralist” view of power, so 
named because it attempts to demonstrate that power is distributed pluralistically 
across many centres of power (Lukes, 1974, p.11).  It does not identify a single, 
unified power elite, but instead argues that there are many competing interest groups 
with differing backgrounds, values, and bases of power.  This view of power has been 
examined in an accounting context by Kwok and Sharp (2005) who concluded that 
the international accounting standard setting process (for segment reporting and 
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intangible assets) involved a “mixed power system” (Kwok and Sharp, 2005, p.74) 
where no one interest group had control over the process of setting international 
accounting standards.   
Polsby (1963, p.113) supported the pluralist focus on actual exercises of 
power, stressing the need to study specific outcomes in order to “determine who 
actually prevails” in decision making.  Therefore, pluralists are concerned with the 
study of “concrete, observable behaviour” (Lukes, 1974, p.12) “either at first hand or 
by reconstructing behaviour from documents, informants, newspapers, and other 
appropriate sources” (Polsby, 1963, p.121).  The popularity of the pluralist view of 
power was aided by the methodological assumptions and research methods of this 
approach which were considered to “turn up hard evidence” and provide reliable 
conclusions that “met the canons of science” (Lukes, 1974, p.12, Merelman, 1968, 
p.451).   
LUKES’ (1974) SECOND DIMENSION OF POWER 
Lukes (1974, p.20) refers to his second dimension of power as a “qualified critique of 
the behavioural focus” of the pluralist view.  Critics of the pluralist view argue that its 
behavioural focus is a key limitation because an observable conflict of interest must 
be present to determine the existence and exercise of power.  Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962), in their “classical contribution” (Lukes, 1974, p.59) to the power literature, 
argued that power in fact has two faces: the first is that advanced by the pluralists, and 
termed the one-dimensional view by Lukes (1974), and the second face of power was 
developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1962, p.948) who argued that 
power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or 
reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the 
scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues 
which are comparatively innocuous to A.  To the extent that A succeeds in 
doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore 
any issues that might in their resolution by seriously detrimental to A’s set of 
preferences. 
In other words, “to the extent that a person or group – consciously or 
unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, 
that person or group has power” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p.8).  Therefore, an 
analysis of two-dimensional power involves examination of both decision making and 
non-decision making.  Bachrach and Baratz (1970) defined these concepts: a decision 
is a “choice among alternative modes of action”, whereas a non-decision “results in 
suppression or thwarting of a latent of manifest challenge to the values or interests of 
the decision maker” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p.35). 
To identify non-decisions, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) suggested that the 
researcher should begin by analysing the decision making process and determining 
the individuals and groups who participated, either directly or indirectly, in the 
process of making the decision.  Following this, a detailed study of the process should 
be conducted to determine the existence of a “mobilisation of bias” and reveal those 
players that are favoured in the decision making process (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970).  
With their two faces of power, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) “in effect redefined the 
boundaries of what is to count as a political issue” (Lukes, 1974, p.19).  While the 
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pluralists maintained that a “political issue can hardly be said to exist unless and until 
it commands the attention of a significant segment of the political stratum” (Dahl, 
1961, p.92), the two-dimensional view highlights the importance of identifying 
potential issues which are prevented from becoming actual, and those that are silenced 
or marginalised by powerful political players (Lukes, 1974).   
Despite Lukes’ (1974) commendation of Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962, 1963, 
1970) contribution to the power literature, he argued that their second face of power 
fell victim to the same limitation as that encountered by the pluralists: namely, the 
focus on actual, observable conflict, whether it be overt or covert.  Like the pluralists, 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970, p.49) felt that “if there is no conflict, overt or covert, the 
presumption must be that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of values, in 
which case non-decision making is impossible”.  Seeking the comfort of empirics, 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970, p.50) justified the need for conflict in investigations of 
power “to determine empirically whether the consensus is genuine or instead has been 
enforced through non-decision making”. 
LUKES’ (1974) THIRD DIMENSION OF POWER 
In developing his third dimension of power, Lukes (1974) conducted a comprehensive 
critique of Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962, 1963, 1970) two faces of power.  His first 
criticism of the two-dimensional view was that it was “still too committed to 
behaviourism”, that is the study of overt behaviour in situations of actual conflict 
(Lukes, 1974, p.21).  Lukes (1974) argued that while decisions may indeed be choices 
between alternatives that are consciously and intentionally made by individuals, it was 
possible that the bias of the system, the “rules of the game”, may be such that 
decisions “are neither consciously chosen nor the intended results of particular 
individual’s choices” (Lukes, 1974, p.21).  Under this conception, the domination of 
power holders may be “so secure and pervasive” that the dominated individuals may 
be unaware of any alternative to the existing political system (Lukes, 1974, p.21).  In 
this way, the rules of the game, that is, the social practices, are  
not sustained simply by a series of individually chosen acts, but also, most 
importantly, by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of 
groups, and practices of institutions, which may indeed by manifested by 
individuals’ inaction (Lukes, 1974, p.22). 
In his critique of the behavioural focus of the one- and two-dimensional views 
of power, Lukes (1974) commented on the limitations of relying on actual conflict to 
determine the existence of power.  He argued that it is “highly unsatisfactory to 
suppose that power is only exercised in situations of conflict” (Lukes, 1974, p.22), 
and noted that two types of power, manipulation and authority, may not involve 
conflict at all.  Lukes (1974, p.23) then proposed his central thesis: 
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to 
do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or 
determining his very wants.  Is it not the supreme exercise of power to get 
another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to 
secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? 
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Lukes (1974) argued that power, as conceptualised in the one- and two-
dimensional forms, is assumed to show up only in cases of actual conflict, however 
this ignores the crucial and very real possibility that “the most effective and insidious 
use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place” (Lukes, 1974, 
p.23).  The three-dimensional view of power, therefore, overcomes the limitations of 
the one- and two-dimensional views by considering the ways in which potential issues 
are excluded from the political process “whether through the operation of social 
forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions” (Lukes, 1974, 
p.25).  It recognises that power need not be empirically verifiable to exist and that the 
status quo may need to be questioned in order for the presence of power to be 
recognised and illuminated.  Lukes’ (1974) three dimensions of power are 
summarised in Table 2. 
One-dimensional 
view of power
Two-dimensional 
view of power
Three-dimensional 
view of power
Theoretical view: Pluralist Two faces of power Radical 
Type of power: Exercise of actual 
power
Exercise of actual 
power                           
Exercise of power by 
confining the scope of 
decision making
Exercise of power by 
'influencing, shaping 
or determining' 
perceptions and 
preferences
Focus on: Decision making Decision making and 
non-decision making
Decision making and 
control over political 
agenda (not 
necessarily through 
decisions)
Observe power via: Overt conflict Overt or covert conflict Overt or covert conflict 
and latent conflict
Key power 
theorists:
Dahl (1957, 1961), 
Polsby (1963)
Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962, 1963, 1970)
Lukes (1974)
(Adapted from Lukes, 1974, p.25)
Table 2: features of Lukes' (1974) three dimensions of power
 
 
This research examines the relationship between the regulator (the 
IASC/IASB) and the regulated industry (the extractive industries) and explores the 
power plays involved in the international accounting standard setting process for the 
extractive industries.  The three-dimensional view of power is used to argue the 
existence of power and how it has been mobilised by extractive industries constituents 
to capture the international accounting standard setting process.  The following 
section reveals the connections between the key players in the international 
accounting standard setting process.    
 
MAKING CONNECTIONS 
Table 1 summarised the raw demographic data obtained from the comment letters 
submitted in response to the Issues Paper.  Analysis of these responses showed that 
the majority of respondents agreed with the Steering Committee’s proposal to 
mandate the use of the successful efforts method only when accounting for pre-
production activities.  This analysis, although relatively superficial, is useful for 
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summarising responses and as a starting point for subsequent investigations of power.  
To conduct these investigations, closer examination of the respondents was 
undertaken and revealed a number of overlapping interests between the key players.  
The overlaps have been categorised in terms of funding, representation, and 
relationships and are portrayed in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Overlaps between IASC/IASB, the Big 4, extractive industries companies, 
and industry lobby groups
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At the centre of these overlaps is the IASC/IASB.  Overlaps exist between the 
IASC/IASB and other key players due to the funding arrangements of the IASC/IASB 
and key players’ representation on the boards and committees of the IASC/IASB.  
The Big 4 accounting firms are portrayed as the first layer of overlap because of the 
substantial financial contribution made by these firms to the IASC/IASB and the high 
level of representation of the Big 4 on the boards and committees of the IASC/IASB.  
Following the Big 4 are extractive industries companies, which overlap with the Big 4 
in terms of auditor/client relationships and with the IASC/IASB in terms of funding 
and representation.  The third layer comprises the industry lobby groups which 
represent the interests of members (which includes extractive industries companies 
and the Big 4) when liaising with the IASC/IASB.   
Figure 2 extends Figure 1 by incorporating details of the constituents involved 
in the international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries 
and their overlapping interests.   
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As shown in Figure 2, the overlapping interests between the IASC/IASB and 
the Big 4 are summarised in terms of financial support, representation, association 
with other key players, and the response to the Issues Paper and successful efforts 
versus full cost issue.  Ernst & Young was the only one of the Big 4 not to make a 
formal response to the Issues Paper.  PwC and Deloitte responded with a preference 
for a single method of accounting consistent with the successful efforts concept, while 
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KPMG also advocated the use of the successful efforts method but was cognisant of 
the value of the full cost to smaller exploration companies.  The financial and 
personnel relationships between the IASC/IASB and the Big 4 are undeniable, 
however, as well as providing financial, personnel, and technical support, the Big 4 
firms serve an important liaison function between the IASB and their clients.  For 
example, at least one of the Big 4 have a focus group, comprising representatives of 
its extractive industries based clients, which meets monthly to discuss issues arising 
from IASB developments, provide training on the implementation of IASB 
pronouncements, and formulate responses to IASB proposals (Personal 
communication, 2004).  Georgiou (2004) provided evidence that a considerable 
number of companies lobby the IASB through their external auditor thus requiring 
extensive consultation between auditor and client in order to ensure that client 
interests are accurately represented.  Ryan et al. (1999, p.177) also noted the tendency 
of auditors to “adopt the position of their clients” when participating in the accounting 
standard setting process.   
Given the relationship between the IASC/IASB and the Big 4, and the Big 4 
and their clients, an indirect relationship is established between the IASC/IASB and 
the major corporations, creating another layer of influence between the IASC/IASB, 
the Big 4, and the major corporations.  This influence is heightened by the direct 
relationship between some of these companies and the IASC/IASB in terms of 
financial support and/or representation, shown as the second layer in Figure 2. 
The second layer presents details of the overlaps between extractive industries 
companies and the IASC/IASB. These extractive industries companies are grouped 
according to their external auditor (that is, one or more of the Big 4) to highlight the 
intricacy of the relationships between the key players in the standard setting process.  
The characteristics of the relationship between the companies and the IASC/IASB is 
summarised according to the nature of the financial contributions (if any) made to the 
IASC/IASB, the representation of the companies (if any) on the boards and 
committees of the IASC/IASB, and the public position (if any) taken by the company 
in respect of the full cost versus successful efforts issue.  Also indicated is whether the 
company has significant associations with other key players in the process (denoted 
by “A” in Figure 2).  Many of the key extractive industries companies identified in the 
second layer also have associations with industry lobby groups, which represent the 
third layer of overlapping interests. 
As shown in Figure 2, the third layer comprises the extractive industries lobby 
groups that participated in the international accounting standard setting process.  The 
extractive industries companies that are represented by these coalitions have been 
listed according to the lobby group that represents them.  These lobby groups are 
powerful coalitions of extractive industries companies that together represent a 
formidable force against the IASC/IASB.  The American Petroleum Institute (API)’s 
membership list, for example, includes six of the world’s top twelve companies that 
together earned revenues in excess of US$1.2 trillion during 2005.  The Oil Industry 
Accounting Committee (OIAC)’s membership list was more elusive than the API’s, 
however the members that could be discerned were equally impressive and also 
included each of the Big 4.  In their responses to the IASC in respect of the Issues 
Paper, both the API and the OIAC argued strongly for the retention of the full cost 
and successful efforts methods of accounting.   
Interestingly, while some of the members of these coalitions individually 
responded to the Issues Paper and commented that they agreed with the IASC’s 
proposal to eliminate the full cost method, they were also likely to be instrumental to 
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the development of the policy positions taken by the lobby groups that represented 
them.  For example, the Exxon Group submitted an independent comment letter in 
response to the Issues Paper that supported the requirement of a single method of 
accounting for exploration and evaluation consistent with the successful efforts 
method.  However, the API’s comment letter was vehemently opposed to the 
elimination of the full cost method.  It is highly likely the Exxon Group, as the largest 
and most powerful member of the coalition, was consulted by the API on this matter.   
Another example is the position taken by the OIAC and those taken by the Big 4, 
which are also members of the OIAC.  While PwC and Deloitte indicated their 
support for the IASC’s proposal to require only the successful efforts method, the 
OIAC strongly opposed this proposal.  However, the collaboration of the OIAC’s 
members in developing the position taken by the Committee must have been 
substantial given that KPMG’s response to the IASC was identical to that submitted 
by the OIAC.    
This analysis of the layers of respondents to the Issues Paper has further 
highlighted the complexity and intricacy of the overlaps between key players in the 
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries.  
Conclusions are presented in the following section, including limitations of the study 
and opportunities for future research. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented the results of a critical examination of the 
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries, 
undertaken to reveal the underlying practices and institutions of accounting, and 
illuminate the political, economic, and social influences that shaped the standard 
setting process and the resultant accounting standards.   
The IASC/IASB’s extractive industries project was commenced in 1998, with 
the objective of enhancing comparability and consistency of extractive industries 
accounting and financial reporting.  Issued in December 2004, the outcome of the 
IASC/IASB’s project so far, IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Assets, is simply a codification of existing industry practice.  This has resulted in a 
perpetuation of the disparate accounting and financial reporting endemic to the 
extractive industries.  In other words, despite all of the time, money, and other 
resources expended to eliminate divergent accounting practices within the extractive 
industries, nothing has changed.  The IASB has stressed that IFRS 6 is an interim 
measure pending further consultation with the extractive industries, however the most 
recent board discussion on the extractive industries research project was an IASB 
Education Session held on 16 October 2006, with subsequent discussion papers based 
on this meeting not expected before mid 2007 (International Accounting Standards 
Board, 2006b). 
The failure of the IASC/IASB to minimise alternative accounting practices for 
the extractive industries was determined to be worthy of further study, in particular 
the role of power in this process.  In this context, this research demonstrates that 
power was exercised via a system of intricate, overlapping interests.  The extractive 
industries, as a collective community of interests, mobilised their power, ensuring that 
the IASC/IASB’s processes, agenda, and discourses were influenced in a way 
favourable to them.  In this way, the IASC/IASB was predisposed to take actions 
consistent with the preferences of these constituents, so that there was no evidence of 
coercion or conflict.  This led to the preservation of the existing flexibility and 
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enabled extractive industries companies to continue to choose between methods of 
accounting for exploration and evaluation.  The status quo was the desired outcome 
for the extractive industries, despite the extensive processes of the IASC/IASB.   
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
The identification of lobbying activity is perhaps more akin to pluralist studies of 
power than the three dimensional view, given that it is an overt behaviour.  In 
addition, lobbying activity may occur relatively late in the process of setting 
accounting standards compared to agenda setting and formulation of proposals.  
However, to compensate for these limitations, lobbying activity was used in this 
research primarily as a starting point for the identification of key players.  This 
formed the basis for detection of the linkages and connections between players.   
The official due process of the IASC/IASB is reasonably transparent, with 
information concerning committees, boards, and participants made publicly available.  
However, the agenda setting process is significantly less transparent and the absence 
of publicly available information concerning the inner workings of this process is a 
limitation of this research.  The setting of the agenda may itself involve elements of 
power as issues are “disregarded, suppressed, or denied agenda entrance” (Walker and 
Robinson, 1993, p.4) by powerful participants (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963, 
Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, Lukes, 1974, Mitnick, 1980).  Unlike Walker’s (1987) 
study, this research was not conducted inside the process and therefore intimate 
complex nuances are not identified.  This research instead places more reliance on the 
role of theory to unmask the presence and role of powerful interest groups.  Given that 
this was an analysis of prior events, and there was limited access, publicly available 
information was considered the most effective means of gathering evidence for the 
presence of power in the international accounting standard setting process for the 
extractive industries.   
FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
 
One opportunity for future research in this are relates to the methods used to collect 
data to support the research question.  Although publicly available information has the 
advantage of offering relatively unproblematic access, a participant observer may be 
able to add valuable insights to the research findings.  The main obstacles to 
participant observation would undoubtedly be gaining access to the IASC/IASB’s 
processes and/or constituents, particularly given the sensitive nature of the research 
issues.   
The theoretical framework developed in this research can be applied to other 
studies of international accounting standard setting projects.  For example, a similar 
study of the IASB’s financial instruments project would be an interesting and valuable 
addition to extant research, particularly given the controversy generated by the project 
and the high profile players with an interest in the project, such as the World Bank, 
J.P. Morgan Chase, Allianz, the European Central Bank, Goldman Sachs, and HSBC 
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2006).   
Other aspects of the extractive industries project may also be explored using 
the research approach and theoretical framework developed in this research.  A 
pertinent and timely issue for the extractive industries concerns accounting for 
removal and restoration expenses, which is an area of substantial accounting 
flexibility.  This area is also likely to be of interest to many and varied stakeholder 
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groups including extractive industries companies, environmental groups, and non-
government organisations.  
The purpose of this research has been to consider the role of power in the 
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries and how 
it has been mobilised by extractive industries constituents.  A framework has been 
considered that enables the identification of a powerful community of interests within 
the extractive industries, which has paralysed the standard setting body under which it 
operates.  While the politicisation of accounting standard setting is widely 
acknowledged, the revelation that economically dominant groups can covertly wield 
such power is a sobering one in the light of the worldwide promotion and adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards.   
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